The Saudi Cold War With Iran Heats Up
While the Obama administration may hope the nuclear deal paves the way for a more peaceful Middle East, it just may convince Riyadh to turn its conflict with Tehran up a notch.
In the days before the nuclear deal with Iran was signed, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry sounded excited about the prospect that an agreement could pave the way for other diplomatic breakthroughs in the region. In an interview with his hometown Boston Globe, he spoke about how the deal is “an opportunity here to galvanize people” and potentially “open some doors” to future regional cooperation.
U.S. President Barack Obama’s first overtures to Iran in 2009, and the back-channel negotiations that started in 2012, took place when the regional landscape looked very different. That was before Iran and Hezbollah sunk their men and resources into propping up Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, before Shiite militias in Iraq deployed in force to counter the so-called Islamic State (IS) — and, crucially, before disenfranchised Sunnis started feeling, rightly or wrongly, that they were taking a beating by Iran across the region.
The negotiations have concluded in Vienna as the rivalry between Tehran and Riyadh is raging across the Middle East, and the deal will make it only harder to get under control. While Riyadh will likely publicly acquiesce to the agreement, the depth of its hostility toward Tehran remains unchanged.
If anything, a deal that Saudi Arabia perceives as a rapprochement between its key ally and its archnemesis will only intensify the proxy war.
We already know that Saudi Arabia is working to counter Iran on even the most minor of issues. From banning Iranian carpets in Mecca, to tracking the movement and numbers of Shiites in countries like Egypt, to removing the head of a university in Islamabad, Saudi diplomacy is extremely hands-on and more effective than most people probably assume, thanks to the power of its checkbook and the relentless pursuit of its key goal: countering the Islamic Republic, as well as the political power of Shiites more generally.
This is the picture you get when you sift through the Saudi diplomatic cables released in June by WikiLeaks. The organization has released 60,000 cables so far, out of an expected total of 450,000; most of those published were written between 2010 and 2013. The Saudis have neither confirmed nor denied the authenticity of the cables.
Sifting through the Arabic documents, with Islamic calendar dates, letterheads, stamps, and hand-written scribbles is time -consuming and tedious. But if you get past the random airfare bills and passport copies, the reward is a fascinating window into the usually secretive world of Saudi diplomacy and the Saudi-Iranian cold war raging across the Middle East.
Riyadh’s obsession with Tehran should not come as a total surprise. We know from U.S. diplomatic cables released by WikiLeaks that in 2008 the Saudis were already calling on the United States to strike Iran and “cut off the head of the snake.”
There are no calls to cut off anyone’s head in the Saudi cables, but they do show in granular detail how Saudi Arabia is obsessively working on pushing back against Iran. Saudi ambassadors around the world monitor every move the Iranians make and report back to the Saudi foreign minister on the smallest, most tedious of details. In one undated cable, for instance, the economic and cultural affairs section of the Foreign Ministry informed then Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal that a renowned Iranian carpet-maker expressed interest in weaving custom-made rugs for the two holy mosques in Mecca and Medina.
For the Saudis, this was not merely a matter of decoration, but an issue fraught with geopolitical significance. The Saudi embassy in Iran weighed in on the matter: This was not a commercial endeavor, it wrote, but a clear political and religious maneuver in line with Iran’s long stated desire to get a foothold into the two holy sites of Islam. The embassy advised that the Iranian request should be turned down, and the minister was urged to agree. We don’t know Saud al-Faisal’s answer — but it’s fair to assume the Iranian carpets never made it to Mecca.
In 2012, the Saudi Embassy in Pakistan sent a cable categorized as “very urgent” to Riyadh to inform the Foreign Ministry that Mumtaz Ahmad, president of the International Islamic University, Islamabad, had committed the terrible faux pas of inviting the Iranian ambassador as a guest of honor to a reception at the university. The president, furthermore, refused to retract the invitation. The embassy urged the ministry to swiftly dispatch the head of Riyadh’s Al-Imam Muhammad Ibn Saud Islamic University to Islamabad for a meeting with the Pakistani university’s board in order to choose another president more in tune with Saudi Arabia’s vision.
I haven’t found the cable that shows the Foreign Ministry’s response, but the current president of the Pakistani university is now a Saudi citizen. Ahmad, who had only been appointed in 2010, is now the head of one of the university’s departments.
Many of these efforts to constrain Iran are seemingly minor. The big issues — such as possible funding for rebel groups in Syria — would be the remit of the intelligence services and are discussed in different cables of a much higher classification.
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